SINGAPORE: The current COVID-19 pandemic could indirectly apply the brakes on North Koreas belligerent behaviour.
Though North Korea initially denied that there was a single COVID-19 case within its borders, the fact that it shares a lengthy border with China makes this highly unlikely.
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Indeed, there was significant trade across this frontier in late 2019 when the virus was spreading rapidly across China. And in early May 2020, Chinese cities near the border with North Korea, such as Jilin, Shulan and Shenyang, were locked down due to COVID-19 clusters.
NORTH KOREA DID NOT ESCAPE COVID-19
In the latter half of April, North Korean healthcare educators revealed there were confirmed coronavirus cases in Pyongyang, South Hwanghae province and North Hamgyong province.
Another report in early March revealed that the epidemic had killed 180 Korean Peoples Army (KPA) soldiers.
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Circumstantial evidence — such as North Korean diplomats quietly seeking protective equipment, medicine and COVID-19 test kits via third party channels — also suggests a significant number of coronavirus cases in the country.
READ: Commentary: The perfect storm for a COVID-19 outbreak lies in North Korea
READ: Commentary: Allowing employees to work from home can help South Korea manage the coronavirus
The pandemic has suppressed economic activity across the world, and North Korea is no exception.
With no vaccine in sight, the North must rely on preventative measures like quarantining suspected cases, lockdowns of specific areas, applying social distancing regulations in workplaces and suspending mass gatherings to moderate the crisis.
COVID-19 HAS ALSO IMPACTED NORTH KOREAN SECURITY
COVID-19 has also hampered North Koreas defence industry, which is already suffering from limitations imposed by comprehensive UN sanctions introduced in 2016.
Agricultural workers and members of the Union of Agricultural Workers of Korea wearing protective face masks gather at a meeting against South Korea and North Korean defectors, at the plaza of the Susan-ri House of Class Education in Kangso District. (Photo: Reuters)
Routine military training may have to be curtailed and large-scale exercises postponed. Otherwise North Korea risks a potential spike of coronavirus infections that it has almost no hope of coping with.
In February 2020, the KPA conducted a live fire demonstration that involved bombarding an undefended islet. This was followed by a series of short-range missile and rocket launches in March and April.
But none of these exercises involve large-scale movement of KPA units, which would be essential to practice capturing land. Short-range missiles also require far less coordination and personnel than their long-range counterparts and are less antagonistic as they dont intrude into Japanese waters or airspace.
READ: Commentary: Imagine a North Korea without Kim Jong Un. Heres why you cant
READ: Commentary: As Iran-US drama plays out, North Korea leader Kim Jong Un takes notes
It would appear these activities were intended as a minimal communication of deterrence against adversaries, while concurrently reassuring domestic audiences of the militarys relevance. But they also allowed the KPA to mitigate the risk of COVID-19 infections among its personnel.
Some analysts suggest that short-range projectiles were selected purely because longer-range ones would overly antagonise the United States. But North Koreas Hwasong-15 ICBM test in November 2017 only flew to a range of 800km, meaning long-range projectiles can be exhibited without risk of antagonism.
While being cautious of Washington might be a factor, less capable missiles also have lower personnel requirements, making them a better choice in these contagious times.
THE CHANCE OF ENDURING CHANGE IN NORTH KOREA
Could this outbreak, with its significant negative economic impact and fatality rate, lead to enduring changes in North Koreas strategic deterrence and nuclear weapons policy? Looking to the past under the rule of the previous North Korean leader Kim Jong Il might provide hopeful clues.
South Korean Lieutenant Choi communicates with a North Korean officer at a military office. (Photo: Reuters)
The Norths decrepit healthcare system means COVID-19 could breed great misery. It might have a similar impact to the series of devastating natural disasters including hailstorms, flooding and tidal waves that plagued North Korea from 1994 to 1997.
This triggered a famine which killed as many as three million people and hobbled the already-weak economy.
Following the unsuccessful test of the Norths first satellite launch rocket in 1998 — which also helped test ballistic missile technology — North Korea accepted a moratorium on missile tests in 1999 in exchange for an easing of US economic sanctions.
Thereafter, the adversaries exchanged emissary visits in 2000. Kim Jong Il offered to permanently cap all aspects of the North Korean missile program including external sales if then US president Bill Clinton would visit Pyongyang to legitimise the agreement.
READ: Commentary: How is North Korea laundering money – and getting away with it?
READ: Commentary: North Korea has been trolling us all this while
The material cost for the United States for substantial compromises from North Korea was foRead More – Source
SINGAPORE: The current COVID-19 pandemic could indirectly apply the brakes on North Koreas belligerent behaviour.
Though North Korea initially denied that there was a single COVID-19 case within its borders, the fact that it shares a lengthy border with China makes this highly unlikely.
Advertisement
Advertisement
Indeed, there was significant trade across this frontier in late 2019 when the virus was spreading rapidly across China. And in early May 2020, Chinese cities near the border with North Korea, such as Jilin, Shulan and Shenyang, were locked down due to COVID-19 clusters.
NORTH KOREA DID NOT ESCAPE COVID-19
In the latter half of April, North Korean healthcare educators revealed there were confirmed coronavirus cases in Pyongyang, South Hwanghae province and North Hamgyong province.
Another report in early March revealed that the epidemic had killed 180 Korean Peoples Army (KPA) soldiers.
Advertisement
Advertisement
Circumstantial evidence — such as North Korean diplomats quietly seeking protective equipment, medicine and COVID-19 test kits via third party channels — also suggests a significant number of coronavirus cases in the country.
READ: Commentary: The perfect storm for a COVID-19 outbreak lies in North Korea
READ: Commentary: Allowing employees to work from home can help South Korea manage the coronavirus
The pandemic has suppressed economic activity across the world, and North Korea is no exception.
With no vaccine in sight, the North must rely on preventative measures like quarantining suspected cases, lockdowns of specific areas, applying social distancing regulations in workplaces and suspending mass gatherings to moderate the crisis.
COVID-19 HAS ALSO IMPACTED NORTH KOREAN SECURITY
COVID-19 has also hampered North Koreas defence industry, which is already suffering from limitations imposed by comprehensive UN sanctions introduced in 2016.
Agricultural workers and members of the Union of Agricultural Workers of Korea wearing protective face masks gather at a meeting against South Korea and North Korean defectors, at the plaza of the Susan-ri House of Class Education in Kangso District. (Photo: Reuters)
Routine military training may have to be curtailed and large-scale exercises postponed. Otherwise North Korea risks a potential spike of coronavirus infections that it has almost no hope of coping with.
In February 2020, the KPA conducted a live fire demonstration that involved bombarding an undefended islet. This was followed by a series of short-range missile and rocket launches in March and April.
But none of these exercises involve large-scale movement of KPA units, which would be essential to practice capturing land. Short-range missiles also require far less coordination and personnel than their long-range counterparts and are less antagonistic as they dont intrude into Japanese waters or airspace.
READ: Commentary: Imagine a North Korea without Kim Jong Un. Heres why you cant
READ: Commentary: As Iran-US drama plays out, North Korea leader Kim Jong Un takes notes
It would appear these activities were intended as a minimal communication of deterrence against adversaries, while concurrently reassuring domestic audiences of the militarys relevance. But they also allowed the KPA to mitigate the risk of COVID-19 infections among its personnel.
Some analysts suggest that short-range projectiles were selected purely because longer-range ones would overly antagonise the United States. But North Koreas Hwasong-15 ICBM test in November 2017 only flew to a range of 800km, meaning long-range projectiles can be exhibited without risk of antagonism.
While being cautious of Washington might be a factor, less capable missiles also have lower personnel requirements, making them a better choice in these contagious times.
THE CHANCE OF ENDURING CHANGE IN NORTH KOREA
Could this outbreak, with its significant negative economic impact and fatality rate, lead to enduring changes in North Koreas strategic deterrence and nuclear weapons policy? Looking to the past under the rule of the previous North Korean leader Kim Jong Il might provide hopeful clues.
South Korean Lieutenant Choi communicates with a North Korean officer at a military office. (Photo: Reuters)
The Norths decrepit healthcare system means COVID-19 could breed great misery. It might have a similar impact to the series of devastating natural disasters including hailstorms, flooding and tidal waves that plagued North Korea from 1994 to 1997.
This triggered a famine which killed as many as three million people and hobbled the already-weak economy.
Following the unsuccessful test of the Norths first satellite launch rocket in 1998 — which also helped test ballistic missile technology — North Korea accepted a moratorium on missile tests in 1999 in exchange for an easing of US economic sanctions.
Thereafter, the adversaries exchanged emissary visits in 2000. Kim Jong Il offered to permanently cap all aspects of the North Korean missile program including external sales if then US president Bill Clinton would visit Pyongyang to legitimise the agreement.
READ: Commentary: How is North Korea laundering money – and getting away with it?
READ: Commentary: North Korea has been trolling us all this while
The material cost for the United States for substantial compromises from North Korea was foRead More – Source
